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ARGUMENT

I. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IMPLICATES THE SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION OF UTAH COURTS.
Hart responds to the County's governmental immunity argument by contending that
Utah courts have "repeatedly held that sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense." Brief
of Appellee, page 9. Hart relies on cases already cited and distinguished in the County's
initial brief. See County's Brief, page 26 and note 5. Utah courts have not "held" that
sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense for purposes of whether the doctrine implicates
the subject matter jurisdiction of Utah courts and may, therefore, be waived. This issue was
neither raised nor considered in the cases cited by Hart or the Utah cases cited by the County
in its initial brief.
An examination of the cited cases reveals they do not stand for the proposition that
governmental immunity does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. First, Ambus v. Utah
State Bd. of Educ, 858 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1993) is not a governmental immunity case.
Although governmental immunity was raised by Ambus on appeal, Ambus, 858 P.2d at
1376, the Utah Supreme Court never addressed governmental immunity. Instead, the Court
sustained the dismissal of Ambus' action based on federal civil rights immunity law. The
Court considered the application of the doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and in that context stated: "Because it is an affirmative defense, the issue of
qualified immunity arises after the plaintiff established a prima facie case under § 1983."
Ambus, 858 P.2d at 1378. Thus, the Ambus decision is simply not relevant to this case.
The statement cited above has been taken out of context and should not bear upon this

Court's analysis of governmental immunity in this case.
The first case in which the Court referred to governmental immunity as an affirmative
defense was Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989). However, the Court did not decide
the nature of governmental immunity but only accepted a preference for deciding duty
questions prior to immunity questions for the sake of analytical clarity. The Ferree court
stated that "[t]he order of analysis . . . in deciding a case that may involve sovereign
immunity will avoid in some instances having to make difficult discretionary exception
doctrine in sovereign immunity cases." Id. at 153. Further, the Court stated that
"[d]eciding an immunity question may first lead to unwarranted assumptions and confusion
about undecided duty problems." Id. at 152. The Ferree court did not consider, let alone
decide, whether governmental immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore,
the cited language cannot be taken as the Court's opinion on an issue which was not before it
and which it did not address1.
Therefore, Utah courts have not addressed the issue of whether governmental
immunity implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of Utah courts. The County has
presented an extensive citation to both federal and state decisions finding that governmental
immunity implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of courts. There is conflicting authority

1

Similarly in subsequent cases, the Court indicated that "sovereign immunity is an
affirmative defense which arises conceptually after the determination of tort liability." C.T.
v. Martinez, 845 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 1992). See also Smith v. Weber County School
District, 877 P.2d 1276, 178 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) and Nelson By and Through Stuckman v.
Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996). Again, none of these cases addressed or
were presented with the question of whether governmental immunity implicates the subject
matter jurisdiction of Utah courts. All of these cases merely reiterate Utah courts'
preference for addressing duty before immunity and incidentally characterize immunity as an
affirmative defense.
2

on this issue2, however, the weight of authority favors finding that governmental immunity
implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of courts.
Federal precedent remains persuasive despite AIG Aviation Ins. Services, Inc. v.
United States, 885 F.Supp. 1496, 1503 (D. Utah 1995) in which Judge Benson observed that
"[d]espite the similarities in language between the state and federal discretionary function
exceptions, the two provisions have been interpreted differently." Judge Benson notes that
federal and state courts have adopted different tests to assess whether a particular act is
discretionary. However, the County is not relying on federal case law to establish that the
act or omission of failing to have a wider shoulder was discretionary. Keegan v. State of
Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995) establishes that the act or omission at issue is discretionary,
not federal case law. Instead, the County cited federal precedent to establish that the nature
of governmental immunity as jurisdictional, rather than a waivable affirmative defense.
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act was patterned in large part after the FTCA. See Taylor
v. Ogden City School District, 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 35 (Utah 1996)(J. Durham,
Dissenting). Therefore, federal case law remains relevant and persuasive on this issue.
Finally, Hart suggests that three federal decisions address "the immunity defense" and
have held such defenses waivable. First, Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1988) and
Maul v. Constan, 928 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1991) are cases considering qualified immunity
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and hence have no bearing on the issue before this Court. In fact,

2

Hart discusses two out-of-state cases and cites others. In Valdez v. City and
County of Denver, 764 P.2d 393 (Colo. App. 1988) and Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752
S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 1988) the Courts did not consider the abundance of federal case law in
support of the proposition that immunity implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of the
courts.
3

in Walsh v. Mellas. 837 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1988) the Court stated that "our jurisdiction over
the subject matter of this lawsuit has not been challenged by the defendants, nor have we
found any jurisdictional defect." In the instant case, the County is challenging the subject
matter jurisdiction of the Court and believes such a defect does exist.
Second, Chrysler Corporation v. United States. 190 F. Supp. 412, 414 (E.D. Mich.
1960) addresses neither qualified immunity nor governmental immunity but the waiver of the
government's collateral estoppel argument. Hart has not cited one federal case which
indicates that sovereign immunity may be waived. The County has not been able to locate
any federal case which indicates that sovereign immunity under the FTC A may be waived.
II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY CAN BE WAIVED, IT
WAS NOT WAIVED IN THE INSTANT CASE.
Hart cites statements of his attorney not those of the County's in an attempt to justify
the trial court's finding of waiver.

A finding of waiver cannot be based on statements made

by opposing counsel. The trial court based its finding of waiver not on the statements of
Hart's counsel, but on the statements of the County's counsel as indicated in the record. (R.
1365 and 1453, 1456). The statements of the County's attorney fail to meet the legal
criterion for waiver as stated in the County's first brief.
Further, the final judgment entered by Judge Sawaya does not indicate that the County
waived or abandoned the immunity argument. (R. 48-49). Hart did not object to the Order
to insist, or even request, that the Order reflect the County's supposedly "clear and
unequivocal" abandonment of such an important issue.

4

III. UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b)(7) PROVIDES A PROCEDURAL
BASIS TO VACATE THE VERDICT BASED ON A CHANGE IN THE LAW.
Hart contends that the County (1) failed to discuss the extraordinary circumstances
test under F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(6), Hart Brief, page 24, and (2) omitted any reference to the
authority establishing this rule.
First, the extraordinary circumstances test was discussed extensively in the County's
brief3. Second, the County cited authority recognizing and applying the extraordinary
circumstances test4. The County's argument is that even if a change in decisional law by
itself is not sufficient to warrant relief from judgment, there are extraordinary circumstances
sufficient to warrant reversal under this test as identified in the peculiar legal history of the
issue.
Hart states that "[w]hile Metz acknowledges that a Supreme Court decision may
warrant Rule 60(b)(6) relief, no Supreme Court decision is implicated in this case." Hart
Brief, page 26 (emphasis added). Certainly no United States Supreme Court case is
implicated. However, given that this case is in state court a change in decisional law on an
issue exclusively involving state law is a supreme court decision, albeit Utah Supreme Court,

3

See County's Brief, pages 34-36; "Keegan v. State . . . presents an extraordinary
circumstance justifying relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(7)," County's Brief, pages
34-35 (emphasis added), "This change in case law strongly compels granting relief from
judgment under Rule 60(b) either by itself or under a compelling circumstances test."
County's Brief, page 36 (emphasis added). Hart's assertion that the County failed to discuss
the extraordinary circumstances test is troubling in light of the County's frequent references
and analysis under the test.
4

See County's Brief, page 34 where the County states that "[o]ther courts require a
showing of extraordinary circumstances." This statement is followed by a citation with
parenthetical of two cases adopting this rule. In addition, in footnote 8 of page 34 the
County states and provides a citation for conflicting authority on this issue.
5

warranting relief from judgment. Understandably, federal courts would look to a change in
United States Supreme Court precedent to justify relief under Rule 60(b).
Hart also contends that Keegan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995) does not
represent a change in case law. First, Hart relies on Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,
842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992) in support of its view that the state of law was clear on the issue
of whether U.C.A. § 63-30-10's discretionary function exception applied to retain immunity
under claims brought under U.C.A. § 63-30-8.
The Utah Supreme Court in Duncan did not address whether the exceptions retaining
immunity in section 10 applied to claims brought under section 8. Instead, the Duncan held
that the upgrading of warning devices at railroad crossing was discretionary under section 10
of the immunity act. The Court reaffirmed the holding of Velasquez v. Union Pacific
Railroad, 469 P.2d 5 (Utah 1970) which held that the failure to require better warning
devices was a discretionary function. The Duncan opinion does not address whether section
10 applied to retain immunity under section 8. The issue is simply never raised or addressed
in Duncan. Therefore, Duncan did not clarify the law on the application of section 10's
discretionary function exception to section 8 claims.
That the law was clear on this issue after Duncan is belied by Taylor v. Ogden City
School District, 881 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) overruled by Tavlor v. Ogden City
School District, 902 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1995). In Tavlor, the Utah Court of Appeals held that
section 10's discretionary function exception did not apply to preclude suits brought under
section 8. The Taylor decision was reversed based on the issuance of Keegan which
reversed the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Taylor. Thus, there is no merit to Hart's

6

contention that the law on this issue was clear after Duncan.
Hart also argues that Keegan did not represent a change in the law based on dictum
contained within Keegan. First, Keegan had the effect of overruling an appellate case on the
same issue. To this extent, it did effect a change in the law. However, the County's change
in law argument is not based on the overruling of Taylor. The Taylor decision is a reflection
of the fact that there were two competing and conflicting rules of law on the dispositive issue
involved in the instant case. Taylor changed the law on this issue, as did Keegan.
The County argues that this change by itself is sufficient to warrant relief in that it is
a change effected by the Utah Supreme Court, the highest authority on this question of state
law. In the alternative, the legal history of section 10's application to section 8 constitutes
an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief from judgment.
IV. THE ACT OR OMISSION IN FAILING TO WIDEN THE SHOULDER OF
WASATCH BOULEVARD IS DISCRETIONARY.
The act or omission in failing to widen the shoulder of Wasatch Boulevard is almost
identical to the facts presented in Keegan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995). In
Keegan, the State was found negligent because it failed to raise a median barrier to AASHTO
specifications. Similarly in the instant case, the County is said to be negligent because it did
not widen the shoulder of Wasatch to AASHTO specifications. If the Court reaches this
issue, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that the act or omission
in question is discretionary. See County's Brief, pages 14-17.
Hart's argument that on discretionary function exception was involved is based on the
erroneous assumption that "Salt Lake County's actions in performing construction work . . .
included operational decision making in compliance with the objective, easily understood
7

AASHTO standards." Hart Brief, page 20. AASHTO standards are not objective and
further often grant governmental bodies a large degree of discretion in deciding how to
implement certain construction projects.

Hart's own expert testified of the discretionary

nature of AASHTO:
Q. Now ASHTO allows for shoulders to be narrower than 10
feet under certain circumstances doesn't it?
A. It does.
Q. And isn't it true that a couple of those factors would be the
cost of the right-of-way, the type of terrain that you are building
a road on? Perhaps the type of material that you would have to
move to build a road, economic feasability of building a road,
those could all justify a narrower shoulder, couldn't they Mr.
Reading?
A. Yes.
Q. Two more factors could also justify a narrower shoulder and
those woud be difficult terrain and mountainous terrain,
wouldn't they?
A. Correct.
(R. 1680).
Earlier Mr. Reading agreed that a ten foot shoulder is merely a recommended
practice. (R. 1679).
Because Keegan is controlling on this issue, the Court may vacate the judgment as it
currently exists. In the alternative, the case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing
on the discretionary function exception.
Hart states that "Salt Lake County openly concedes the absence of evidence at trial on
this critical defense issue." Hart Brief, page 15. This statement is odd, considering this
excerpt from the County's brief: "Even Hart's expert, Mr. Reading, put on evidence which
establishes the discretionary nature of the decision regarding the widening of the shoulder
along Wasatch Boulevard." The County then goes on to identify specific testimony of Mr.
8

Reading. The County did not concede the absence of evidence at trial on this issue.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON
COMPARATIVE FAULT AS REQUESTED BY THE COUNTY.
The trial court justified its refusal to instruct on comparative fault in its written order
as follows:
At a final pretrial conference with the Court to consider jury
instructions and the special verdict form, held in chambers,
counsel for Defendant advised the court that Defendant had no
evidence to suggest negligence on the part of the Plaintiff and
would not request the Plaintiff be included on the Special
Verdict form. The Court agreed with that assessment and
adopted a Special Verdict form which did not include the
Plaintiff.
(R. 1454).
The trial court's denial of the County's motion for new trial5 was erroneous for two
reasons. First, the "fact" finding that the County acquiesced was improper. Second,
assuming arguendo that the County acquiesced in the pretrial conference, the trial court erred
in refusing to instruct on comparative fault.
Because there is no record of the conference in which the County supposedly
acquiesced to the removal of Hart from the verdict form, there was no evidence upon which
the trial court could properly base its factual determination. All of the portions of the record

5

Hart states that "althought it [the County] raised comparative fault, it argued only
that more fault should have been attributed to Mr. Tweedy, not Mr. Hart." Hart Brief, page
6, fact paragraph 12. This assertion is disturbing in light of the fact that the County argued
that it should have been allowed to compare the fault of Hart. "Defendants were entitlted to
argue that the plaintiff was in part responsible for his own injuries." (R. 1244). Of course,
this issue was extensively argued.
9

relating to this issue include (1) the trial court's statements6 (R. 2370-2372; 2385-2387); (2)
Mr. Schmutz's unsworn oral representations to the trial court (R. 2384-2387); (3) Mr.
Postma's sworn affidavit7 (R. 1303-1306); (4) the special verdict forms submitted by the
County and Hart; (R. 967-1031-1033; 1073-1076); (5) Hart's objections, or the lack thereof
to the County's special verdict form; (R. 1064-1066); and (6) the manner in which the
County conducted the litigation and trial. Hart in his statement of facts cites only to the
transcript of the oral argument as the basis for the alleged acquiescence. Hart Brief, page 5;
para. 8.
None of these cited portions of the record support the trial court's finding. In fact,
the record contradicts the trial court's finding. The only portions of the record on appeal
which arguably supports the trial court's finding are contained in the transcripts to the June
28, 1995 oral argument on the County's post-trial motions. Mr. Schmutz gave his
recollection of events to the trial court,(R. 2384-2387), stating in part that:
There was a pretrial conference the week before trial began

6

The trial court did suggest its memory was more consistent with Mr. Schmutz's in
that the there was "almost acquiesence" by the County on the present issue. The trial court's
statements are not entirely explained by sarcasm, however. The trial court did not recall
whether the County placed Hart on the special verdict form. (R. 2370-2371). In fact, the
County did submit such a verdict form. (R. 1031-1033). Inasmuch as the submission of the
special verdict form was an assertion of the County's right to compare the fault of Hart, it
appears the trial court did not not recall whether the County asserted its right to comparative
fault.
7

The trial court struck Mr. Postma's affidavit as stated in the County's first brief.
However, Mr. Postma's affidavit is not necessary to the resolution of the comparative fault
issue. The trial court plainly erred given the record without Mr. Postma's affdavit. Mr.
Postma's affidavit is corroborated by the record. Thus, even if the Court sustains the trial
court's striking the affidavit of Mr. Postma, the trial court still erred in failing to instruct on
comparative fault.
10

when the court specifically asked counsel for both sides, but
specifically asked counsel for the defendant if there was any
evidence, if they believed they had any evidence regarding
contributory negligence on the part of Mr. Hart. Now I am
working on memory also but it was my understanding and my
clear recollection at that time that they were somewhat equivocal
but ended up saying they had no evidence and did not feel they
could put on any evidence regarding Hart.
(R. 2384-2385).
Unlike Mr. Postma, Mr. Schmutz never submitted an affidavit to the trial court
attesting to his recollection. Therefore, Mr. Schmutz's statements constitute the unsworn
statements of counsel at oral argument which is not a proper basis upon which to find a fact.
After Mr. Schmutz gave his recollection, the trial court stated:
I just wanted to comment that the recitation of that event is
more consistent with this court's recollection and I am just
going to be honest and up front. I guess I was a little put aside,
as I indicated earlier, Mr. Postma's apparent crystal clear
recollection of something different. I just could not recall Salt
Lake County asserting their position that they thought the
plaintiff should be on the verdict form for comparative
negligence purposes. I thought it was almost acquiescence that
there was no negligence on the part of the plaintiff . . . .
(R. 2386).
It was error for the trial court to resolve this factual dispute based on the judge's own
purported personal knowledge of the disputed evidentiary fact concerning the proceeding, if
that was in fact the basis of its ruling. The disputed evidentiary fact was whether the County
asserted its right to compare the fault of Hart. Mr. Postma submitted an affidavit that it did
in an in camera conference with the judge. Mr. Schmutz disagreed in his unsworn
statements to the trial court. The trial court apparently resolved the dispute based on its own
personal knowledge of what it believed occurred at the in camera conference over eight
11

months earlier. In essence, the trial court became a fact witness and the trier of fact at the
same time. Thus, the trial court's and Mr. Schmutz's statements cannot sustain the trial
court's finding.
The trial court initially stated what it believed was the basis of its ruling:
I am not sure Mr. Postma's recitation is accurate at this point,
but I do know for sure that I did not include the plaintiff on the
Special Verdict Form becuase I didn't think there was any
evidence establishing — any evidence establishing that the
plaintiff was negligent.
(R. 2371)(emphasis added).
The trial court's first version of events is consistent with the record. The pretrial
conference took place on Tuesday, August 23, 1994. (R. 901). Three days after the alleged
acquiescence, the County submitted a special verdict form with Hart on the verdict form.
(R. 1031-1033). On the last day of trial, Friday, September 2, 1994, Hart submits his own
special verdict form without Hart on the verdict form. (R. 1073-1076). Perhaps most telling
is the fact that Hart submitted objections to the County's submittals on that same day which
did not include an objection to the County's special verdict form despite the County's alleged
prior acquiescence. (R. 1064-1066). Finally, the special verdict forms each have an
initialed handwritten notation from the trial court indicating on Hart's "given"(R. 1075) and
on the County's "not given." (R. 1033).
Finally, Hart argues that the County's conduct before trial and at the trial supports a
finding of acquiescence. This argument is specious. First, the County's summary judgment
motions of December 1991 and early 1992 cannot realistically be said to reflect the County's
intent at a pretrial conference over two years later. In addition, Hart was not deposed at the
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time of these motions. And, of course, Hart had not yet testified at trial. Therefore, the
County's pre-trial conduct cannot be said to reflect the County's intent to assert or abandon a
comparative fault argument at trial. As Hart's objection notes, "Plaintiff reserves the right
to propose supplemental instructions to reflect the evidence presented at trial." (R. 1065).
Obviously, which instructions and which special verdict form will be called for will be
determined by the course of the trial. Further, it is Hart's testimony which provides the
basis for the submission of comparative fault. The County was entitled to see how the
evidence turned out at trial and base its request on that as well as the prior testimony of Mr.
Hart.
Given the state of the record, it cannot be argued seriously that the County acquiesced
to the removal of Hart from the special verdict form. The assertion that the County never
asserted its right to place Hart on the verdict form is contradicted by every shred of objective
evidence contained in the record. Accordingly, the trial court's determination should be
reviewed only to assess whether there was evidence of comparative fault. The trial court's
determination should not be shielded from review by an alleged unrecorded in camera
acquiescence which is contradicted by the record.
As a matter of law, the trial court erred even assuming the correctness of its factual
determination. The plain language of U.C.A. § 78-27-39(l)(Supp. 1994) required the trial
court to give allow apportionment of fault. The statute is mandatory, not permissive.
The record reveals that the final pretrial conference was conducted on Tuesday,
August 23, 1994. (R. 901). The County submitted its special verdict form Friday, August
26, 1994. (R. 967 & 1031-1033). Therefore, assuming arguendo that the County acquiesced
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on the issue of comparative fault of Hart on Tuesday, August 23rd, the County later made a
formal written request on Friday, August 26th, which supersedes the prior alleged oral
acquiescence. Mr. Schmutz indicated that the acquiescence occurred at "a pretrial
conference the week before trial." (R. 2384). Neither Hart nor the trial court identified
any other in camera conference after the pretrial conference where the County waived
comparative fault8. Therefore, as a matter of law the trial court's finding is erroneous. The
record shows a written request which was denied by the trial court. (R. 1033). In light of
the fact that the County submitted a written special verdict form which sought to apportion
the fault of Hart, the trial court's finding of acquiesence can no longer stand. The only issue
is whether the trial court's ruling was correct, not whether the County acquiesced.
Hart's contention that the County conceded there was not direct testimony on
comparative fault is taken out of context. The full sentence quoted by Hart is as follows:
I think that is crucial here because although there wasn't direct
testimony, it is our position that there was at least reasonable
inferences from the plaintiff's testimony himself that perhaps he
was at least to some degree comparatively at fault in this case.
(R. 2371-2372)(emphasis added). At the time of oral argument, the County's attorney
stated that "the record has not been produced yet. . . . we would defer to the actual record

8

The undersigned understands that there were additional pretrial conferences during
trial to consider the special verdict form after the verdict forms were submitted. Mr.
Postma's affidavit does not identify the particular in camera conference where the County
asserted comparative fault. However, it makes no sense for the County to acquiesce to not
place Hart on the comparative fault form prior to its submission. The trial court's order as
drafted by Mr. Schmutz explicitly bases the finding of acquiescence at the pretrial
conference. In his brief, Hart specifically identifies the conference as "the August 23, 1994
pretrial conference." Hart Brief, page 5. This finding makes little sense in light of the
record.
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on that . . ." (R. 2372). The County has cited evidence taken from Mr. Hart's testimony
which would support a finding of comparative fault.
Next, Hart contends that the County's failure to object to the proposed special verdict
supports the trial court's finding. Hart Brief, page 35, note 35. However, this is not relevant
under Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Hart ignores the fact that the County
submitted its special verdict form to the trial court and that the trial court specifically
indicated in its own handwriting that the instruction was "not given." (R. 1031-1033).
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[n]o party may assign as error the
giving or failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto." However, Rule 499 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governing special verdicts provides that:
If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the
pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a
trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires
he demands its submission to the jury.
Out-of-state case law interpreting Rule 49 states that "a party may preserve its
objection by proposing a special verdict form including the issue which is objected or by
objecting to a proposed special interrogatory." Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767,
772 (Mont. 1990)(emphasis original). In addition, "[t]he purpose of either method is to
direct the court's attention to the omitted issue." Id.
The County submitted its own special verdict form and that this verdict form clearly

9

Although there is Utah case law stating that a party must object to a special verdict
form to preserve the issue for appeal, no Utah case appears to address the different language
in Rule 49 and 51 as stated in the Montana case. See Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson
Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985) and Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111 (Utah
1991).
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sought to apportion fault to Mr. Hart. Hart submitted a competing special verdict form. The
trial court refused to give the County's instruction and chose to give the instruction provided
by the plaintiff Richard S. Hart. The County sufficiently preserved its objection under Rule
49 by the submission of its own special verdict form. The handwritten note of the trial court
indicates that the trial court was aware of the verdict form and declined to give it. The
purpose of Rule 49 was satisfied in this instance.
VI. THE AFFIDAVIT OF TOSH KANO IS RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE TO THE
QUESTION OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY.
Hart's response to the County's argument that Hart's motion to strike was untimely
inaccurately characterizes the record. On page 17 of Hart's brief counsel represents that
"Mr. Hart's June 1, 1995 objection to the "after-the-fact" affidavit was timely." In fact no
"objection" to Mr. Kano's affidavit was submitted to the trial court until Hart's motion to
strike on October 6, 1995. What Hart characterizes as an "objection" is in reality a one
sentence statement in a footnote in a memorandum: "Indeed, the "after-the-fact" Affidavit of
Tosh Kano begs the entire question." (R. 1553).
The evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling was erroneous. The affidavit attests
to fact relevant to the issue of the discretionary function exception under Utah law. As such
it is relevant. Further, the objections posed go only to the weight not admissibility of the
evidence.
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VII. UTAH'S DAMAGE CAP LIMITATION, U.C.A. § 63-30-34, IS
CONSTITUTIONAL.
Hart raises numerous constitutional challenges to the damage cap limitation of Utah's
Governmental Immunity Act, U.C.A. § 63-30-34 (1993). The constitutionality of U.C.A. §
63-30-34 (1993) was affirmed in the face of nearly identical challenge to the one presented
by Hart. See McCorvev v. Utah State Dept. of Transp.. 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993). The
Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the McCorvev ruling in Bott v. DeLand. 922 P.2d
732, 743 (Utah 1996) stating that:
We have already held that these subsections are constitutional
under article I, sections 7, 10, 11, and 24 of the Utah
Constitution as applied to judgments for injuries resulting from a
governmental entity's failure to maintain safe road conditions.
Hart relies on Bott as a basis to renew his constitutional challenge to the damage cap
under Article 1, Section 1. However, in Bott the Court held that the damage cap constituted
an unreasonable regulation of the plaintiff's article 1, section 9 rights. Id. at 744. The
plaintiff in Bott brought a state constitutional claim for violation of his rights. Hart has
brought no such claim, but instead has brought a claim for negligence. Bott is therefore
inapposite.
In McCorvev v. Utah State Dept. of Transp, . 868 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1993) the Utah
Supreme Court addressed a challenge to Utah's damage cap limit under the Open Courts
provision and stated that:
Because no right existed at common law to recover from the
state for injuries arising out of the state's maintenance of public
roadways, the legislature is free to limit the state's liability in
that area without implicating the open courts clause and its
concomitant heightened scrutiny.
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The construction and maintenance of public roads is a governmental function. See
Niblock v. Salt Lake Citv. I l l P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1941)10("This court is committed to the
doctrine that the duty to repair or construct streets within its corporate limits is a
governmental one and that in the absence of a statute no liability devolves on a municipality
for the defective condition of its streets."). Therefore, under McCorvev. Hart's challenge
under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution fails.
Article I, Section 7 states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law." The open courts clause is "an extension of the due
process clause." Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670, 679 (Utah
1985). Therefore, for the same reasons the damage cap limit does not violate Article I,
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
To pass constitutional muster under Article I, Section 24 (Uniform Operation of
Laws), the Court must assess (1) whether the classification is reasonable; (2) whether the
objectives of the legislative action are legitimate; and (3) whether there is a reasonable
relationship between the legislative classification and the legislative purpose. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989).
A rational basis standard is appropriate because no fundamental right is implicated.
Thus, the issue is whether the damage cap has a rational relationship to a legitimate
legislative objective. The damage cap limits the County's liability and thus serves the

10

Niblock v. Salt Lake City. I l l P.2d 800 (1941) was called into question by dictum
in DeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 438 (Utah 1995). Justice Zimmerman specifically noted
that much of Justice Stewart's opinion was dictum and he did not concur therein. Niblock
was not overruled and remains the law in the State of Utah. In addition, McCorvev is
consistent with Niblock.
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legitimate and important public purpose of protecting the County's treasury. The limits
safeguard public funds and preserve the government's ability to discharge its public
responsibilities while affording some recovery to those injured by governmental tort-feasors.
Without the damage cap the County as well as other governmental entities would be
subject to unlimited liability. This would make it increasingly difficult, perhaps impossible,
to purchase sufficient insurance coverage. Governmental functions, such as the maintenance
and construction of public roads, which must be performed by the government involve an
extremely high degree of risk. These governmental functions create the potential for liability
for beyond the potential liability of nonessential governmental entities or other corporations
in the private sector. See Condemarin v. University Hospital, 755 P.2d 348 (Utah
1989)(CJ. Hall, Dissenting) and Lee v. Colorado Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo.
1986)(sustaining damage cap under equal protection challenge).
Because Hart has not provided adequate briefing on the remaining constitutional
provisions (trial by jury, special laws) the Court should decline to address these issues. State
v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1007 n. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(declining to address state
constitutional argument for lack of adequate briefing). See also State v. Yates, 834 P.2d
599, 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and U.R.A.P. 24(a)(9).
In the alternative, the damage cap does not violate the right to jury trial because the
right only applies to cases that would have been cognizable at common law. Zions First
National v. Rocky Mountain Irrigation, 795 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1990). No common law
right at common law existed for the type of action Hart brought. Further, even assuming
such a right existed a common law, the damage cap does not abrogate the right to a jury
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trial. See Wright v. Colleton County School District, 391 S.E.2d 564, 569-570 (S.C.
1990)("The General Assembly of South Carolina may enact, alter, or repeal any law or
remedy unless inconsistent with the South Carolina Constitution. Consequently, we find that
the statutorily imposed limit on the amount of damages recoverable from the State is a proper
exercise of legislative power.").
In the alternative, the damage cap is not a special law because "the constitutional
prohibtion of special legislation does not preclude legislative classification, but only requires
the classification be reasonable." Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Utah Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 564
P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 1977). The damage cap reasonably classifies as stated in the equal
protection argument.
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO ALLOW HART COSTS AND
INTEREST IN EXCESS OF THE DAMAGE CAP LIMIT.
U.C.A. § 63-30-34 (1995) limits the amount of liability for damages for personal
injury against the County to $250,000 per person. Hart seeks more than the statutory limit
through a claim to costs and interest. Hart contends that because the statute limits damages
for personal injury, the damage cap does not limit costs and interest which, it is contended,
are different than personal injuries.
Hart's argument ignores the objectives of the Governmental Immunity Act which is to
place an outer limit on the legal liability of a governmental entity in order to enable
government to provide fiscal certainty to governmental operations. This secures the
continuing availability of those services to the public. The need to preserve the public
treasury and the need for a reasonable degree of fiscal certainty in risk management and
budgeting for governmental functions without undue burdens are legitimate purposes of the
20

Act. If Hart is allowed to exceed the damage limits by adding pre and post judgment interest
as well as costs the objectives of the Act will be frustrated.
Although no Utah court has addressed this issue, other state courts have. In Lee v.
Colorado Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221, 228 (Colo. 1986) the Colorado Supreme Court held
that its immunity act's damage cap "imposefd] a maximum limitation of $150,000 on the
total amount recoverable against a public entity for a single injury in a single occurrence."
The court held that costs and interests could not be imposed above the statutory limit. Id.
The court reasoned:
This restriction on costs and interest finds its source in one of the basic
objectives of the Governmental Immunity Act, which . . . is to place an outer
limit on the legal liability of a public entity in order to provide fiscal certainty
to governmental operations and thereby secure the continuing availability of
these services to the public. Costs and interest will vary from case to case,
and this variability is incompatible with the fiscal certainty essential to ongoing
governmental operations.
Id. at 229.
Colorado's damage cap, like Utah's, simply caps damages for personal injuries. See
Lee v. Colorado Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d at 225. Another state court has stated that costs
and interest are not available beyond their state's damage cap limit. See also Berek v.
Metropolitan Dade County, 422 So.2d 838, 840 (1982)("The maximum amount of the state's
liability to any one claimant arising out of any one incident or occurrence, therefore, is
$50,000, including damages, costs, and post-judgment interest.").
Hart's argument is also contrary to the rule of statutory construction that "when two
provisions address the same subject matter and one provision is general while the other is
specific, the specific provision controls." Dairvlands Ins. Co. v. State Farm Auto Ins., 882
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P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1994). Utah's general interest and costs statutes are general, the
damage cap limits are specific and addresses claims against the government in excess of
$250,000.

CONCLUSION
The County requests the Court to vacate the judgment rendered against it for the
grounds stated in its initial and reply brief. In the alternative, the County requests that the
case be remanded for appropriate factual determinations on the issue of immunity or for a
new trial so that the fault of Hart can be compared.
DATED this J_ day of
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